USA v. Keonna Thomas by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-21-2018 
USA v. Keonna Thomas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Keonna Thomas" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 749. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/749 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2644 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 v. 
 
 KEONNA THOMAS 
 
 
              PHILLY DECLARATION, L.L.C., and AUSTIN 
NOLEN, 
                                   Appellants  
 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM  
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 2-15-cr-00171-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 10, 2018 
______________ 
 
  
 2 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO, and BIBAS, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 21, 2018) 
 
Jennifer A. Williams 
Office of United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street 
Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA 19106  
  Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee 
 
Kathleen M. Gaughen 
Brett G. Sweitzer 
Elizabeth Toplin 
Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania 
601 Walnut Street 
The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
  Counsel for Defendant-Appellee 
 
Michael L. Berry 
Paul J. Safier 
Ballard Spahr 
1735 Market Street 
51st Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
  Counsel for Intervenors-Appellants 
______________ 
 
OPINION  
______________ 
 3 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Philly Declaration, LLC and its managing editor Austin 
Nolen (collectively, “The Declaration” or “the intervenors”) 
appeal the District Court’s order denying their motion to unseal 
certain court records in a criminal prosecution.  For the reasons 
that follow, we hold that while a presumptive right of access 
under the First Amendment attaches to plea hearings and 
documents related to plea hearings, the District Court properly 
concluded that the compelling government interests of national 
security and safety would be substantially impaired by 
permitting full access to the plea document here.  The proposed 
redactions on appeal to the remaining documents at issue, 
meanwhile, are more properly considered in the first instance 
by the District Court.  Accordingly, we will affirm in part and 
vacate in part the District Court’s order and remand the case 
for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
 In April 2015, Keonna Thomas was arrested on charges 
that she “knowingly attempted to provide material support and 
resources . . . to a designated foreign terrorist organization”1 in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.  A39.  After a federal grand 
jury returned an indictment, Thomas pled not guilty.  She filed 
several pre-trial motions, including a motion for a bill of 
particulars and a motion to compel notice and discovery of 
                                                 
 1   The criminal complaint and indictment specify the 
designated foreign terrorist organization as the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant, also known as ISIS. 
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surveillance, all of which the District Court ultimately denied.  
In September 2016, Thomas pled guilty pursuant to a plea 
agreement, and a sentencing hearing, although initially 
postponed, was ultimately held in September 2017.   
 As of November 2016, access to several documents on 
the docket was restricted to the public.2  That month, The 
Declaration moved to intervene in the case and obtain access 
to:  “all records that [at that time] appear[ed] on the docket as 
sealed or inaccessible”; transcripts of Thomas’s plea hearing 
and her ex parte presentation to the court regarding the motion 
to compel notice and discovery of surveillance; and “any 
search warrant materials pertaining to the investigation and 
prosecution of the Defendant.”  A81.   
 In response to The Declaration’s motion, the 
Government agreed that certain records, such as the search 
warrant materials, should be fully or largely unsealed.  The 
Government, however, maintained that, among other 
documents not at issue on appeal, the “Plea Document” that 
was docketed on the same day as the publicly-filed guilty plea 
memorandum should remain under seal for reasons detailed in 
a sealed addendum.  The Government also objected to 
unsealing a “Grand Jury exhibit” (“Exhibit”) attached to 
Thomas’s reply brief in support of her motion for a bill of 
                                                 
 2   Some documents, such as Thomas’s motion to 
compel notice and discovery of surveillance and the 
Government’s response to that motion, had been initially filed 
under seal but were then followed by a redacted copy or 
unsealed in full. 
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particulars (“Reply Brief”) and to unredacting “any quotes 
thereof and citations thereto” that appeared in the Reply Brief 
itself.  A114.   
 On March 8, 2017, after oral argument, the District 
Court granted in part and denied in part The Declaration’s 
motion, permitting intervention and ordering that only the 
documents that the Government deemed appropriate to unseal 
should be unrestricted.  In the same order, the lower court 
permitted the intervenors time to review the materials unsealed 
by the Government and file a supplemental memorandum if 
they believed any continued sealing was improper.  The 
Declaration renewed its request to unseal the Plea Document, 
the Reply Brief and Exhibit, and another motion and order.3   
 Following a supplemental hearing, the District Court 
issued an opinion and order on June 29, 2017 denying the 
request on the basis that:  (1) “Intervenors have no right of 
access to grand jury material [contained in or referenced by the 
Reply Brief and Exhibit], and Thomas’[s] individual 
restrictions, with respect to Rule 6 [of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure] and pursuant to a protective order, do[] 
not change that fact,” A8; and (2) concerning the remaining 
documents, including the Plea Document: 
[T]he Government’s pursuit of ongoing law 
enforcement activities outweighs the public’s 
right of access to the [Plea Document and order 
and motion regarding courtroom security] under 
                                                 
 3   This motion and order, ECF Nos. 24 and 26, related 
to courtroom security precautions and were unsealed following 
Thomas’s sentencing; they are not at issue in this appeal. 
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both federal and common law. The Government’s 
investigation related to this case involves national 
security issues and its non-public nature is critical 
to its success. Additionally, unsealing these 
documents could jeopardize the safety of 
numerous individuals.  
 Moreover, the Court now finds, as it has 
previously found (ECF 99), that the sealing of 
these records was narrowly tailored to protect the 
law enforcement interests at stake in this matter, 
and was the least restrictive means possible to 
safeguard the interests at issue. There is no 
reasonable alternative to keeping these 
documents under seal that would adequately 
protect the compelling interests of both Thomas 
and the Government. If these documents were to 
be made public, significant law enforcement 
activities could be thwarted and lives placed at 
risk. 
A10 (citations omitted).  
 This timely appeal followed. 
II. Jurisdiction 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the underlying 
action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See United States v. 
Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Orders either 
granting or, as in this case, denying access to court proceedings 
or records are appealable as final orders under § 1291.”). 
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III. Discussion 
 On appeal, The Declaration argues that the District 
Court’s sealing decisions infringe upon its right of access to the 
judicial documents under the First Amendment and/or 
common law.  First, Appellants claim that the continued 
sealing of the Plea Document is improper given the absence of 
“specific, individualized findings as to the necessity” of that 
restriction by the District Court, in addition to the lower court’s 
failure to “adequately consider[] alternatives to wholesale 
sealing” and “provid[e] The Declaration with a meaningful 
opportunity to oppose sealing.”  Appellants’ Br. 14.  Second, 
The Declaration contends that the District Court erred in 
holding that Rule 6(e) bars the disclosure of the grand jury 
materials in the Reply Brief and Exhibit.  In particular, the 
intervenors state not only that Rule 6(e) does not apply to the 
materials that had been provided to Thomas in discovery and 
developed outside of the grand jury process, but also that “the 
substance of the sealed material already appears to have been 
disclosed in other public filings.”  Id. at 14-15. 
 In their joint response brief, the Government and 
Thomas maintain that, while the “press and public have a First 
Amendment presumptive right of access to plea documents 
generally,” the District Court here properly sealed the Plea 
Document.  Appellees’ Br. 22-25.  Appellees, though, concede 
that “most of the sealed content [in the Reply Brief and 
Exhibit] is substantively already part of the public record.”  Id. 
at 36.  They therefore “agree to unseal the [Reply Brief] with 
only light redactions to [the Exhibit].”  Id.   
 “We exercise plenary review over whether the First 
Amendment or the common law creates a presumptive right of 
access to judicial documents or proceedings.”  Smith, 123 F.3d 
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at 146.  In considering a First Amendment right of access 
claim, “we exercise independent appellate review of the 
record”; our scope of review of factual findings is therefore 
“substantially broader than that for abuse of discretion.” Id. 
(quoting United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1357 (3d Cir. 
1994)). With respect to the common law right of access claim, 
we review for abuse of discretion.  Id.  
A. Plea Document 
 The First Amendment “provides a public right of access 
to criminal trials,” other aspects of criminal proceedings such 
as voir dire, and “the records and briefs that are associated with 
those proceedings.”4  Id.  The Supreme Court of the United 
                                                 
 4   The Supreme Court, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980), recognized a First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials, and it then 
extended that holding to voir dire, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court of Cal. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 505-
10 (1984), and “preliminary hearings as they are conducted in 
California,” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. 
(Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986).   Our Court has 
expanded the presumptive First Amendment right of access to 
other contexts.  See, e.g., United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 
840 (3d Cir. 1994) (post-trial hearings to investigate juror 
misconduct); In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application for 
Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(transcripts of chambers and sidebar conferences); United 
States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1112 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(indictments, informations, and bills of particulars); Publicker 
Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(civil trials); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (pre-trial suppression, due process, and entrapment 
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States has articulated a two-prong “experience and logic” test 
to apply in determining whether there is a presumptive right of 
public access to a particular aspect of a criminal trial.  United 
States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9).  As we have summarized: 
Under the “experience” prong, a court considers 
“whether the place and process have historically 
been open to the press and general public.”  
Under the “logic” prong, a court considers 
“whether public access plays a significant 
positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question” by, inter alia, enhancing 
“both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and 
the appearance of fairness so essential to public 
confidence in the system.” 
 
                                                 
hearings).  But see, e.g., N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. United 
States, 836 F.3d 421, 434 (3d Cir. 2016) (rejecting in a criminal 
case a claim of First Amendment right of access to pre-trial 
discovery materials); N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
308 F.3d 198, 220 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting a claim of First 
Amendment right of access to “deportation cases that are 
determined by the Attorney General to present significant 
national security concerns”); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. 
Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1986) (rejecting a 
claim of First Amendment right of access to the administrative 
records of a state agency). 
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Id. at 234 (citation omitted) (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 
U.S. at 8-9).   
 Plea hearings have usually been open to the press and 
public, and public access to those hearings furthers several 
societal interests, including promoting the “public perception 
of fairness,” “exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny,” 
and “providing the public with the more complete 
understanding of the judicial system”—especially where a 
substantial majority of criminal cases are resolved by guilty 
pleas.  Smith, 123 F.3d at 146-47 (quoting United States v. 
Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986)).   
 We therefore hold, in accord with our sister circuits that 
have reached this issue, that the First Amendment right of 
access applies to plea hearings and, by extension, to documents 
related to those hearings.  See United States v. DeJournett, 817 
F.3d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[P]lea agreements are the 
quintessential judicial record, entitled to the protection of the 
First Amendment right to public access of judicial records.”); 
Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(“[T]here is a first amendment right of access to plea 
agreements . . . .”); Oregonian Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for 
Dist. of Or., 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Just as there 
exists a first amendment right of access in the context of 
criminal trials, it should exist in the context of the means by 
which most criminal prosecutions are resolved, the plea 
agreement.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Haller, 837 
F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that there is a right of 
access to plea hearings and “documents filed in connection 
with those hearings,” and noting that “[p]lea hearings have 
typically been open to the public, and such access . . . serves to 
allow public scrutiny of the conduct of courts and prosecutors” 
(citation omitted)); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 
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(4th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e hold that the First Amendment right of 
access applies to documents filed in connection with plea 
hearings . . . , as well as to the hearings themselves.”); see also 
United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(stating that the First Amendment right of access extends not 
only to judicial proceedings, but also to judicial documents). 
 This right of access, though, is presumptive and not 
absolute, and it can be overcome where there is “cause shown 
that outweighs the value of openness.”  Smith, 123 F.3d at 147 
(quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509).  A district court 
sealing a criminal record must make “particularized findings . 
. . on the record in each case, (1) establishing the existence of 
a compelling governmental interest, and (2) demonstrating that 
absent limited restrictions upon the right of access, that other 
interest would be substantially impaired.”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1359 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 First, the intervenors maintain that the District Court’s 
findings regarding the continued sealing of the Plea Document 
are not sufficiently specific or individualized.  We disagree.  
The District Court determined that the Government’s law 
enforcement activities, which involved national security issues 
and hinged on their non-public nature, and the safety of certain 
individuals constituted compelling interests that would be 
substantially harmed by unsealing.  These findings are 
“specific enough [to allow us to] determine whether the 
[sealing] order was properly entered.”  Press-Enterprise I, 464 
U.S. at 510; accord United States v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218, 
225-26 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding no error with “the district 
court’s somewhat brief findings”); see United States v. 
Kooistra, 796 F.2d 1390, 1391 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The findings 
need only be sufficient for a reviewing court to be able to 
determine, in conjunction with a review of the sealed 
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documents themselves, what important interest or interests the 
district court found sufficiently compelling to justify the denial 
of public access.”).  Moreover, we have noted similar interests 
as appropriate reasons to restrict access to judicial records and 
proceedings.  See Raffoul, 826 F.2d at 223 (“The right [of 
access to criminal trials] is limited by the . . . needs of the 
government to . . . preserve the confidentiality of sensitive 
information . . . .”); Smith, 776 F.2d at 1105 (“[T]he risk of 
serious injury to third parties from disclosure outweighs the 
interest of the public in access to this limited segment of the 
bill of particulars.”).  Requiring the District Court to provide 
extensive detail on the public record, meanwhile, would impair 
“the very secrecy which sealing was intended to preserve.”  
Kooistra, 796 F.2d at 1391.   
 Our independent review of the record satisfies us that 
the District Court’s statements were not mere assertions or 
speculation.  In addition, despite the intervenors’ argument to 
the contrary, that the same interests supported the continued 
sealing of the Plea Document and the courtroom security 
motion and order does not detract from the individualized 
consideration of the nature of each specific document at issue. 
 Second, The Declaration argues that there is no 
indication that the lower court considered alternative measures 
to wholesale sealing of the Plea Document.  The District Court, 
however, expressly stated “that the sealing of these records was 
narrowly tailored to protect the law enforcement interests at 
stake in this matter, and was the least restrictive means possible 
to safeguard the interests at issue.”  A10.  In the same sentence, 
it referred to a sealed order docketed as ECF No. 99, suggesting 
that it had previously made the same determination and 
undertaken the alternative measures consideration.  Our own 
review of the Plea Document leads us to find no error with the 
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District Court’s approach.  Here, redacting only a portion of 
the document, as the intervenors suggest, would not 
sufficiently protect Appellees’ interests in confidentiality of 
sensitive information and individuals’ safety.   
 Third, the intervenors assert that the District Court’s 
sealing decision, based on reasons articulated in the 
Government’s sealed addendum, deprived them of their 
meaningful opportunity to respond.  In support of its argument, 
The Declaration relies on language in In re Capital Cities, 
where we vacated the lower court’s order denying the media 
access to sealed transcripts and notes of chambers and sidebar 
conferences.  913 F.2d at 90.  We explained that the media 
“was at a severe disadvantage in trying to show that its First 
Amendment and common law rights of access. . . overcame the 
government’s interest” where: (1) “at the time of its application 
to unseal . . . , [it] had absolutely no information concerning 
[the documents’] particular subject matter . . . [or] the 
government interests that would enter into the . . . analysis, and 
so it could not directly rebut the reasons that led the district 
court to seal the . . . documents”; and (2) it was denied a hearing 
to move for “access to sealed transcripts of a closed 
proceeding.”  Id. at 95 (quoting Raffoul, 826 F.2d at 225).   
 The Declaration, however, was in a substantially 
different position than the media entity in In re Capital Cities.  
The docket made clear that the document at issue was a “Plea 
Document” that was filed along with the publicly-accessible 
guilty plea memorandum.  The District Court here also held 
two hearings on the issue of unsealing the documents requested 
by the intervenors, and the Government at the supplemental 
hearing specifically referred to “safety, security, national 
security” and “the interest in preserving life and safety of 
individuals” as its reasons for sealing the Plea Document in its 
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entirety.  ECF No. 129, at 13.  While a more thorough 
discussion of the Government’s rationale for continued sealing 
appeared only in its sealed addendum, that alone does not 
violate First Amendment principles given the circumstances.  
See In re Copley Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“It’s rarely possible to justify one secret without telling 
other secrets.”).  Accordingly, we are not persuaded by The 
Declaration’s argument or the comparison to In re Capital 
Cities. 
 The intervenors’ claim as to their common law right “to 
inspect and copy public records and documents, including 
judicial records and documents,” such as the Plea Document 
here, fares no better.  Smith, 123 F.3d at 155 (quoting United 
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981)); see In re 
Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining 
that the common law right can be overcome if “the party 
seeking the . . . sealing of part of the judicial record . . . 
[‘]show[s] that the material is the kind of information that 
courts will protect’ and that ‘disclosure will work a clearly 
defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure’” 
(alteration added) (quoting Miller v. Ind. Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 
551 (3d Cir. 1994))).  The District Court’s order denying 
access to the Plea Document was not an abuse of discretion.  
B. Reply Brief and Exhibit 
 Appellees concede on appeal that the Reply Brief 
should be publicly available because the portions currently 
under seal are “substantively already part of the public record.”  
Appellees’ Br. 36.5  For the same reason, they agree to only 
                                                 
 5   We are flummoxed that Appellees have only now—
after the intervenors’ filing and briefing of their appeal—
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lightly redact the Exhibit.  In response, The Declaration argues 
that the Exhibit should also be fully unsealed and that, by not 
making the same argument below, Appellees have waived 
justifying any redactions on grounds other than grand jury 
secrecy.    
 The intervenors are correct that “[t]heories not raised 
squarely [before the district court] cannot be surfaced for the 
first time on appeal.”  Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 
F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Joseph, 
730 F.3d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We hold that for parties to 
preserve an argument for appeal, they must have raised the 
same argument in the District Court—merely raising an issue 
that encompasses the appellate argument is not enough.”).   
 The circumstances here, however, are unlike the typical 
waiver case in light of Appellees’ significant concession and 
newly-proposed redactions on appeal.  The issue to be resolved 
now is to what extent the Exhibit should be redacted, if at all.  
Given the factual—as opposed to purely legal—nature of the 
inquiry presented, we deem it more appropriate for the District 
Court to initially determine whether the proposed targeted 
redactions are justified and narrowly tailored in a manner that 
does not impinge upon the public’s right of access.  
Accordingly, the District Court’s order as to the Reply Brief 
and Exhibit will be vacated and the case remanded for 
consideration of the proposed redactions to the Exhibit. 
                                                 
conceded that the materials in question should be mostly 
unsealed. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court as it pertains to the Plea Document, vacate 
the order as it relates to the Reply Brief and Exhibit, and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
